Introduction
Traditional epistemic logic can be seen as a particular branch of modal logic. Its semantics is defined in terms of Kripke models, and philosophical principles about knowledge (e.g. factivity: Kϕ → ϕ) are shown to correspond to properties of the epistemic accessibility relation (e.g. reflexivity). By adding another (doxastic) accessibility relation, also belief can be treated in this framework. Belief is not assumed to be factive, but at least consistent (¬B⊥), which corresponds to requiring the doxastic accessibility relation to be serial instead of reflexive. In this extended framework, one can study the interaction between knowledge and belief (e.g. is Kϕ → Bϕ a valid principle?); cf. [5, 8] . Furthermore, since this framework is still 'just' a (multi-)modal logic, it inherits the mathematically well-developed model theory of modal logic.
However, it is well-known that dynamic phenomena cannot be captured in this framework; cf. section 3.1 of [7] . To remedy this, epistemic plausibility models have been introduced (technical details will be presented later). In these models, one can again study knowledge, belief (and even other cognitive propositional attitudes), and their various interactions. Furthermore, this framework provides a realistic model of various dynamic phenomena, and thus solves the main problem of the previous approach. However, because epistemic plausibility models are much richer structures than Kripke models, they do not straightforwardly inherit the model-theoretical results of modal logic. Therefore, while epistemic plausibility structures are well-suited for modeling purposes, an extensive investigation of their model theory has been lacking so far.
The aim of the present paper is to fill exactly this gap, by initiating a systematic exploration of the model theory of epistemic plausibility models. Like in 'ordinary' modal logic, the focus will be on the notion of bisimulation -it turns out that finding the right generalization of this notion is not a trivial task. In Section 2, we introduce epistemic plausibility models and discuss some important operators which can be interpreted on such models, and their dynamic behaviour. In Section 3, we define various notions of bisimulations (parametrized by a language L) and show that L-bisimilarity implies L-equivalence. We establish a HennesyMilner type theorem, and prove two undefinability results -thus shedding some light on the formal relationships between the various operators that can be interpreted on epistemic plausibility models. The notion of bisimulation for conditional belief, however, turns out to be unsatisfactory for several reasons. In Section 4, we discuss these reasons and explore two possible solutions: adding a modality to the language, and putting extra constraints on the models. In Section 5, we establish some results about the interaction between bisimulation and dynamic model changes.
From a broader perspective, this paper can be seen as a reaction against a widespread trend in the technical modal logic literature (already since the 1960's), viz. the inclination to focus almost exclusively on the model theory of 'classical' single-quantifier modalities, while neglecting more-quantifier modalities (which are of central importance for applications in game theory, AI, philosophy, and linguistics).
Finally, it should be noted that this paper is mainly exploratory in nature. Especially with respect to the problem of finding bisimulations for conditional belief, the aim is to provide a (partial) map of the wide landscape of possible solutions, rather than to argue for the ultimate correctness of one of them.
Epistemic plausibility models
We now introduce epistemic plausibility models. Let G be a non-empty set, whose elements will be called agents. Throughout this paper, we will keep the set of agents fixed, so that it can almost always be left implicit. Likewise, we assume that P rop is a (countably infinite) set of proposition letters, which will also be kept fixed throughout the paper. Definition 1. An epistemic plausibility model is a structure M = W, {∼ i } i∈G , {≤ i,w } w∈W i∈G , V , where W is a non-empty set of states, ∼ i ⊆ W × W is the epistemic accessibility relation for agent i, ≤ i,w ⊆ W × W is the plausibility order for agent i at state w, and V : P rop → ℘(W ) is a valuation.
As usual, w ∼ i v is to be read as: "agent i cannot epistemically distinguish between states w and v". We assume this relation to be an equivalence relation. Furthermore, w ≤ i,s v is to be read as: "at state s, agent i considers w at least as plausible as v". We take this relation to be a well-founded pre-order. 1 Also note that this relation is not only dependent on agents, but also on states: it is possible for agent i to have different plausibility orderings at different states (from Section 4 onwards, more constraints will be placed on this state-dependency).
Various epistemic and doxastic notions can be interpreted on epistemic plausibility models. The three most important ones are: (i) K i ϕ (i knows that ϕ), (ii) B α i ϕ (i believes that ϕ, conditional on α), and (iii) B + i ϕ (i safely believes that ϕ). 'Normal' belief can be defined in terms of conditional belief, by putting B i ϕ := B i ϕ.
We abbreviate [w] ∼ i := {v ∈ W | w ∼ i v} (the ∼ i -equivalence class of state w ∈ W ). The semantics for the notions above can now be stated as follows: Definition 2. Consider an epistemic plausibility model M and state w; then
We now turn to the dynamics. In this paper, we will focus on two specific dynamic phenomena: public announcement (hard information) and radical upgrade (soft information). Public announcement of a formula ϕ in an epistemic plausibility model M simply removes all ¬ϕ-states from the model. Radical upgrade with ϕ, on the other hand, makes all ϕ-states more plausible than all ¬ϕ-states, and leaves everything within these two zones untouched. Formally, this looks as follows:
Consider an epistemic plausibility model M = W, {∼ i } i∈G , {≤ i,w } w∈W i∈G , V and a formula ϕ. We now define the following epistemic plausibility models:
In order to be able to talk about these new models in the object language, we add operators [!ϕ] and [⇑ ϕ]. Hence, the full language L(K, B c , B + , !, ⇑) has the following Backus-Naur Form (BNF): 2
We now link up the models and the language by defining the semantics for the two dynamic modalities. Note that since public announcement is assumed to be truthful, it works with a precondition; this is not the case for radical upgrade.
Definition 4.
Consider an epistemic plausibility model M and state w; then
Finally, dynamic epistemic/doxastic logics are constructed using the well-known modular approach: (i) one starts by taking (an axiomatization of) some static base logic (in a sufficiently rich language, so that step (iii) can be done successfully 3 ), (ii) then one adds dynamic operators to this logic and (iii) finally, one provides a sound set of reduction axioms, which allow each formula in the dynamic language to be rewritten as an equivalent formula in the static language. Because of this final step, completeness of the dynamified logic is reduced to completeness of the static base logic. It also shows that the dynamic language L(K, B c , B + , !, ⇑) is equally expressive as the static language L(K, B c , B + ).
We illustrate this methodology by providing the most important reduction axioms for public announcement and radical upgrade, viz. those in which the epistemic/doxastic operators are being rewritten:
The following are all sound with respect to epistemic plausibility models:
3 Bisimulation for epistemic plausibility models
We now start our investigation of the model theory of epistemic plausibility models. The focus will be on the notion of bisimulation, which is also central in the model theory of Kripke models. Since we want to explore bisimulation for various languages, we make it into a parametrized notion, so that each language has its own notion of bisimulation, which 'does what it needs to do, and nothing more'.
Below are the definitions of K-bisimulation, B + -bisimulation and B c -bisimulation. Since K i is just the universal modality for ∼ i , the notion of K-bisimulation is that of regular bisimulation from modal logic. The notion of B + -bisimulation is a straightforward generalization. The notion of B c -bisimulation, however, is much more intricate, since it involves universally quantifying over all formulas of the language L(B + ). We will return to this issue in later sections.
Definition 6. Given epistemic plausiblity models
• if (w, w ) ∈ Z and w ∼ i v and v ≤ i,w w, then there is a v ∈ W such that (v, v ) ∈ Z and w ∼ i v and v ≤ i,w w
• if (w, w ) ∈ Z and w ∼ i v and v ≤ i,w w , then there is a v ∈ W such that (v, v ) ∈ Z and w ∼ i v and v ≤ i,w w Definition 8. Given epistemic plausiblity models
The following theorem shows that these are the 'right' notions, since they allow us to establish a characteristic feature of bisimulation: bisimilarity implies modal equivalence.
Theorem 9. Consider two epistemic plausiblity models
Proof. Each of these three statements is easily proved by induction on the complexity of ϕ.
To illustrate this, we treat the cases for the epistemic/doxastic modality. 1. Suppose that (w, w ) ∈ Z and M, w |= K i ϕ; we show that also M , w |= K i ϕ. Consider an arbitrary v ∈ W and suppose that w ∼ i v . By Definition 6, there exists a
we get by the induction hypothesis that also M , v |= ϕ. The other direction is completely analogous.
2. Suppose that (w, w ) ∈ Z and M, w |= B 
Using these separate notions of bisimulations, we can now introduce bisimulations for languages which have more than just one of the operators K/B + /B c in a modular way (although conditional belief complicates matters a little bit). Obviously, these combined notions lead to results analogous to Theorem 9; we state just two of these (without proof) as Theorem 11, for future reference.
Definition 10. Consider epistemic plausiblity models
• Z is a {K, B + }-bisimulation iff Z is a K-bisimulation and a B + -bisimulation
• Z is a {K, B c }-bisimulation iff Z is a K-bisimulation and a B c -bisimulation, with the universal quantifiers in Definition 8 ranging over
• Z is a {K, B + , B c }-bisimulation iff Z is a K-bisimulation, a B + -bisimulation, and a B cbisimulation, with the universal quantifiers in Definition 8 ranging over
Theorem 11. Consider two epistemic plausiblity models M = W, {∼ i } i∈G , {≤ i,w } w∈W i∈G , V and M = W , {∼ i } i∈G , {≤ i,w } w ∈W i∈G , V , and a relation Z ⊆ W × W .
One can also wonder about the converse direction of theorems such as Theorem 11: if
One of the main results from the model theory of basic modal logic, viz. the Hennesy-Milner theorem (cf. [2] , Theorem 2.24) says that this question can be answered positively, at least when the models are assumed to be image-finite. This theorem can easily be generalized to epistemic plausibility models:
We say that M is image-finite if for all i ∈ G and all w ∈ W , the set [w] ∼ i is finite.
Theorem 13. Consider two image-finite models M = W, {∼ i } i∈G , {≤ i,w } w∈W i∈G , V and M = W , {∼ i } i∈G , {≤ i,w } w ∈W i∈G , V . Then for all states w ∈ W and w ∈ W , if M, w |= ϕ ⇔ M , w |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L(K, B c ) (we will write w ≡ {K,B c } w ), then w and w are {K, B c }-bisimilar.
Proof. We use the trick of the Hennessy-Milner theorem for basic modal logic, viz. we show that ≡ {K,B c } is itself a {K, B c }-bisimulation. If w ≡ {K,B c } w , then the atoms clause is trivially fulfilled. We now focus on the zig-clauses of Definitions 6 and 8 (extended to L(K, B c ) instead of just L(B c ), cf. supra); the zag-clauses are treated completely analogously.
Zig-clause for K-bisimulation. Suppose that w ≡ {K,B c } w and w ∼ i v; we will show that there is a v ∈ W such that v ≡ {K,B c } v and w ∼ i v . For a reductio, suppose that this is not the case; so for all
Zig-clause for B c -bisimulation. Consider an arbitrary formula α ∈ L(K,
We can now rephrase ( * * ) as follows:
One of the main uses of bisimulation is studying (un)definability results. We will now illustrate this by proving two undefinability theorems. Both of these theorems can be seen as tying up some loose ends, in the sense that the results were expected, but not yet explicitly proved in the existing literature. Theorem 14. Conditional belief cannot be defined in terms of knowledge and safe belief. 4 Proof. For a reductio, suppose conditional belief is definable in terms of knowledge and safe belief. Consider the formula B p q. Since conditional belief is definable in terms of K and B + , there is a formula ϕ ∈ L(K, B + ) such that M, w |= B p q ↔ ϕ for all epistemic plausibility models M and states w.
Now consider the models M and M pictured below (we focus on one agent i, and drop agent subscripts for the sake of readability). It is easy to check that the dotted line Z is a {K, B + }-bisimulation. Since ϕ ∈ L(K, B + ), it follows by Theorem 9 that M, w |= ϕ iff M , w |= ϕ, and hence also M, w |= B p q iff M , w |= B p q.
Since
Theorem 15. Safe belief cannot be defined in terms of knowledge and conditional belief.
Proof. For a reductio, suppose safe belief is definable in terms of knowledge and conditional belief. Consider the formula B + p. Since safe belief is definable in terms of knowledge and conditional belief, there is a formula ϕ ∈ L(K, B c ) such that M, w |= B + p ↔ ϕ for all epistemic plausibility models M and states w. Now consider the models M and M pictured below (we focus on one agent i, and drop agent subscripts for the sake of readability). It is easy to check that the dotted lines Z form a K-bisimulation. We claim that they also form a B c -bisimulation (this claim is proved later). Since ϕ ∈ L(K, B c ), it follows by the first part of Theorem 11 that M, w |= ϕ iff M , w |= ϕ, and hence also M, w |= B + p iff M , w |= B + p. However, using Definition 2, one easily checks that M, w |= B + p, while M , w |= B + p; contradiction.
We now prove the claim that Z is a bisimulation. Note that for any x ∈ {w, v} and X ⊆ {w, v}, it holds that Min ≤x (X) = X and [x] ∼ = {w, v}. 5 Hence we get that y ∈
We already know that w and w , and v and v agree on all atoms. Hence, reconsidering Definition 8, the following remains to be shown: ∀α ∈ L(K, B c ) : if (x, x ) ∈ Z and M, y |= α, then ∃y ∈ W : (y, y ) ∈ Z and M , y |= α ∀α ∈ L(K, B c ) : if (x, x ) ∈ Z and M , y |= α, then ∃y ∈ W : (y, y ) ∈ Z and M, y |= α Note that the condition (x, x ) ∈ Z is vacuous. Furthermore, since Z = {(w, w ), (v, v )}, this can be rewritten as the following
This claim is easily proved by induction on the complexity of α. We treat the cases for knowledge and conditional belief. If α = Kϕ, then we have: Footnote 5) . This finishes the proof of the claim, and thus also of Theorem 15.
Structural bisimulations
We already noted in the previous section that the notion of B c -bisimulation introduced in Definition 8 is much more intricate than the other notions. We will now argue that this definition is unsatisfactory for both theoretical and practical reasons.
On the theoretical level, since Definition 8 involves universal quantification over L(B c ), it is not strictly structural. Rather than stating conditions on ∼ i and ≤ i,w (as is done in Definitions 6 and 7 of bisimulations for knowledge and safe belief), it essentially involves truth sets of (arbitrary) formulas. A related issue is that this definition of bisimilarity for models cannot be turned into a definition of bisimilarity for frames by simply dropping the 'atoms' clause (as can be done with Definitions 6 and 7): it depends on truth sets of formulas
, and thus also on the concrete valuations of the models M and M .
Practically speaking, Definition 8 makes it often very difficult to prove that two given epistemic plausibility models are actually B c -bisimilar. In the appendix of [4] , induction on the complexity of α (with a cleverly strengthened induction hypothesis) is used to establish that the zig-and zag-conditions of Definition 8 hold for all formulas α. However, this approach is geared towards proving one particular B c -bisimilarity result (about two artificially crafted models), and cannot easily be generalized to the general case (proving B c -bisimilarity of arbitrary models). Similar remarks apply to our proof of Theorem 15. Furthermore, recall that one of the main goals of introducing bisimulations is that they allow us to prove equivalence results. For example, in Theorem 15, we want to show that the two pictured models are {K, B c }-bisimilar, and then (using the first part of Theorem 11) conclude that they are L(K, B c )-equivalent. However, note that while establishing the B c -bisimilarity, we ended up proving a separate claim, which just is the original L(K, B c )-equivalence result we were looking for. This seems to be some kind of practical 'circularity' (we want bisimilarity to get equivalence -but to get bisimilarity, we already need equivalence), which renders the current notion of B c -bisimulation practically useless.
We will now propose two different solutions to this problem, and explore and compare their advantages and disadvantages. Both solutions involve reducing conditional belief to other modalities which have more standard notions of bisimulation. The first approach involves both extending the language and putting some mild constraints on the epistemic plausibility models. The second approach puts more heavy constraints on the models, but does not need to extend the language. Both solutions have in common that we end up only needing fully structural notions of bisimulation, without any universal quantification over formulas.
Adding a new modality
The first approach 6 combines language engineering and putting some mild constraints on the models. These constraints are captured by the following definition:
Definition 16. An epistemic plausibility model M = W, {∼ i } i∈G , {≤ i,w } w∈W i∈G , V is called uniform iff the plausibility relations are uniform within epistemic equivalence classes, i.e. iff for any i ∈ G and w, v
This is a natural condition to impose on epistemic plausibility models: it leads to the (intuitively plausible) epistemic/doxastic introspection principle that agents know their (conditional) beliefs. Furthermore, uniformity is a dynamically robust notion, in the sense that if an epistemic plausibility model is uniform, then after it has undergone some dynamics, it is still uniform.
Theorem 17. If an epistemic plausibility model
Proof. Consider an arbitrary state w of M and suppose that M, w |= B α i ϕ. Consider an arbitrary v ∈ [w] ∼ i ; it now suffices to show that M,
is an equivalence relation) and ≤ i,w = ≤ i,v (because M is uniform). Hence ( †) becomes:
Theorem 18. If an epistemic plausibility model M is uniform, then so are M!ϕ and M ⇑ ϕ.
Proof. Consider a uniform model M. We treat the case of public announcement. Consider arbitrary states w, v of M!ϕ and suppose that w ∼ !ϕ i v. By Definition 3, we get that w ∼ i v. Since M is uniform, it follows that
The case of radical upgrade is completely analogous.
Uniform epistemic plausibility models will become very important later on. First, however, we need to set up some other things. For any agent i ∈ G and state w in a plausibility model, let us abbreviate < i,w := ≤ i,w − ≥ i,w and ∼ = i,w := ≤ i,w ∩ ≥ i,w (so x < i,w y iff x ≤ i,w y and not y ≤ i,w x; and x ∼ = i,w y iff x ≤ i,w y and y ≤ i,w x). Note that since ≤ i,w is a pre-order and thus not necessarily antisymmetric, it is possible that x ∼ = i,w y and yet x = y. One can easily verify the following fact, which expresses minimality in terms of the strict ordering <:
Fact 19. Consider an epistemic plausibility model M = W, {∼ i } i∈G , {≤ i,w } w∈W i∈G , V , a set X ⊆ W and a state w ∈ W . Then for any state x ∈ W , it holds that x ∈ Min ≤ i,w (X) iff x ∈ X and there is no y ∈ X such that y < i,w x.
We now extend our language with a modality [> i ] to talk about this strict version of the plausibility order. As in Definition 2, the semantics for this modality is relativized to the epistemic equivalence classes:
Definition 20. Consider an epistemic plausibility model M and state w; then
We now show that adding this new modality [> i ] as a primitive operator is justified, in the sense that it cannot be defined in even the richest language of the previous section:
Proof. We focus on one agent i, and drop agent subscripts for the sake of readability. Consider the models pictured below (we assume that all proposition letters are made true everywhere:
We first prove an auxiliary claim about the right model M :
Proof of auxiliary claim. We prove this by induction on the complexity of ϕ. The base case, for proposition letters p, is true because V (p) = {w , v } for all p ∈ P rop. The Boolean cases are trivial. We now focus on the three epistemic/doxastic operators:
•
This finishes the proof of the auxiliary claim about M . We now use this to prove that M and M are statewise
We prove this again by induction on the complexity of ϕ. The base case holds because V (p) = {w, v} and V (p) = {w , v } for all p ∈ P rop. The Boolean cases are trivial. We now focus on the three epistemic/doxastic operators:
Analogously we prove that M, v |= Kψ iff M , v |= Kψ
Since ∀x ∈ W : x ≤ w w ⇔ x ∈ {w, v} and ∀x ∈ W : x ≤ w w ⇔ x ∈ {w , v } (and [w] ∼ = {w, v} and [w ] ∼ = {w , v }), we have
The [>]-modality is actually so expressive that, together with the knowledge operator, it is able to define the notion of conditional belief -at least, when we restrict ourselves to the uniform epistemic plausibility models introduced at the beginning of this subsection.
Theorem 22. For all uniform models M, it holds that
Proof. Consider an arbitrary uniform model M and a state w of M. Note that for any
is an equivalence relation) and that ≤ i,w = ≤ i,x (since M is uniform). This justifies step ( ‡) below:
We now introduce the notion of [>]-bisimilarity, which -as desired -is fully structural:
• if (w, w ) ∈ Z and w ∼ i v and v < i,w w, then there is a v ∈ W such that (v, v ) ∈ Z and w ∼ i v and v < i,w w
• if (w, w ) ∈ Z and w ∼ i v and v < i,w w , then there is a v ∈ W such that (v, v ) ∈ Z and w ∼ i v and v < i,w w
Part 1 of Theorem 24 shows that this is the right notion of bisimulation. Furthermore, we get combined notions of bisimulation in the obvious way. In particular, {K, [>]}-bisimulations are combined K-and [>]-bisimulations; since both of the latter notions are purely structural, also {K, [>]}-bisimulation is structural. Part 2 of Theorem 24 is the analogue of part 1 for this combined notion. Most importantly, part 3 states that when we restrict ourselves to the class of uniform models, we can get equivalence for conditional belief 7 by means of a structural notion of bisimulation. Finally, part 4 says that if we restrict to uniform image-finite models, then (structural) {K, [>]}-bisimilarity implies {K, B c }-bisimilarity (which involves universal quantification over formulas).
Theorem 24. Consider two epistemic plausiblity models M = W, {∼ i } i∈G , {≤ i,w } w∈W i∈G , V and M = W , {∼ i } i∈G , {≤ i,w } w ∈W i∈G , V , and a relation Z ⊆ W × W .
If Z is a [>]-bisimulation, then for all ϕ ∈ L([>]
) and for all (w, w ) ∈ Z, it holds that M, w |= ϕ ⇔ M , w |= ϕ.
tural notion of bisimulation). In itself, however, it does not seem to have any intuitive epistemic/doxastic reading. 9 Therefore, this solution ends up looking a bit ad hoc.
Assuming connectedness
The second approach tries to keep the advantages of the first one, while avoiding its major drawback, viz. the ad hoc introduction of new operators. The basic idea is that, with an extra condition on the epistemic plausibility models, conditional belief can be reduced to knowledge and safe belief. Hence, the B + -operator plays the role of the [>]-operator in the previous approach, but unlike the [>]-operator, it does have an intuitive doxastic interpretation. The extra condition on the models that we need is local connectedness:
Definition 25. An epistemic plausibility model M = W, {∼ i } i∈G , {≤ i,w } w∈W i∈G , V is called locally connected iff for all agents i ∈ G and states w, v ∈ W it holds that if w ∼ i v, then
Whether this is a natural condition is a bit more doubtful than in the case of uniformity. At least, local connectedness is dynamically robust: • M, w |= ϕ, M, v |= ϕ. Analogous to the previous case.
• M, w |= ϕ, M, v |= ϕ. Then by Definition 3, w ≤ ⇑ϕ i,w v.
We now show that, when we require the models to be both uniform (cf. the previous subsection) and locally connected, then conditional belief can be defined in terms of knowledge and safe belief. 10 Theorem 27. For all uniform and locally connected models M, it holds that
Proof. Consider an arbitrary uniform and locally connected model M and a state w of M. We will only work in the model M, and can therefore write x |= ψ instead of M, x |= ψ. We prove both directions:
We now prove that x |= B + i (α → ϕ). Consider an arbitrary y ∈ [x] ∼ i and suppose that y ≤ i,x x and y |= α; we will show that y |= ϕ. Since w |= B α i ϕ, it suffices to show that
We already know that y |= α and since y ∼ i x and x ∼ i w, also y ∼ i w; hence
and suppose that z ≤ i,w y; we show that y ≤ i,w z. Since y ≤ i,x x and x ∼ i w, we get by uniformity that y ≤ i,w x. Together with z ≤ i,w y,
Together with y ≤ i,w x, this implies that y ≤ i,w z. We now show that x ≤ i,y y. Since x ∼ i w and y ∼ i w, we get that x ∼ i y. Since M is locally connected, it follows that x ≤ i,y y or y ≤ i,y x. In the first case, we're done. Now suppose that the second case obtains. Since y ∼ i w, we get by uniformity that y ≤ i,w x. Again by uniformity, we get x ≤ i,y y.
We have proved that x ≤ i,y y. Also recall that x ∼ i y. Hence, it follows from y |= B + i (α → ϕ) that x |= α → ϕ. Since x |= α we get that x |= ϕ.
Using this definability result, we can now immediately prove the analogon of Theorem 24; of course, since we did not have to introduce a new modality and a new notion of bisimulation corresponding to it, we only reformulate its third and fourth part. The importance of this is that when we restrict ourselves to the class of uniform and locally connected models, we can get equivalence for conditional belief by means of a structural notion of bisimulation, viz. {K, B + }-bisimulation. Furthermore, if we restrict to the uniform, locally connected and image-finite models, then (structural) {K, B + }-bisimulation implies {K, B c }-bisimilarity (which involves universal quantification over formulas).
Theorem 28. Consider two epistemic plausiblity models M = W, {∼ i } i∈G , {≤ i,w } w∈W i∈G , V and M = W , {∼ i } i∈G , {≤ i,w } w ∈W i∈G , V , and a relation Z ⊆ W × W . original static language L(K, B + , B c ). Thus, information about what will be the case after some change has taken place can be pre-encoded in the static language. We will now combine this pre-encoding strategy with Theorem 28:
Theorem 29. Consider two uniform and locally connected epistemic plausiblity models M = W, {∼ i } i∈G , {≤ i,w } w∈W i∈G , V and M = W , {∼ i } i∈G , {≤ i,w } w ∈W i∈G , V , states w ∈ W and w ∈ W , and a {K, B + }-bisimulation Z ⊆ W × W such that (w, w ) ∈ Z. Furthermore, consider an arbitrary formula ϕ ∈ L(K, B + , B c ); then:
Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to explore the model theory of epistemic plausibility models, which has been largely ignored in the present literature. We focused on the notion of bisimulation, and proved various bisimulation-implies-equivalence type theorems, a Hennesy-Milner type theorem, and two undefinability results. However, our main conclusion is a negative one, viz. that bisimulations cannot straightforwardly be generalized to epistemic plausibility models if conditional belief is taken into account. We presented and compared two different ways of coping with this issue: adding a modality to the language, and putting extra constraints on the models. Finally, we established some results about the interaction between bisimulation and dynamic model changes, and commented on the strength of bisimulation to establish equivalence 'now and in the future'.
As this is one of the first papers on the model theory of epistemic plausibility models, there is obviously still much work to be done in this area. The main question asked in this paper, viz. what is the right notion of bisimulation for conditional belief, has not yet received a fully satisfactory answer. More work is needed on comparing the approaches developed in this paper, but also on developing still other approaches that have thus far remained under our radar. Finally, this paper has focused almost exclusively on the topic of bisimulation, but one can also consider other topics from the model theory of modal logic, such as relations with first-order logic (via the standard translation), and investigate whether/how they can be generalized.
